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Slaves in the Family:
Testamentary Freedom and Interracial Deviance
Kevin Noble Maillard*
Syracuse University College of Law

ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the deviance of interracial sexuality acknowledged in
testamentary documents. The language of wills calls into question the authority of
probate and family law by forcing issues of deviance into the public realm. Will dramas,
settled in or out of court, publicly unearth insecurities about family. Many objections to
the stated intent of the testator generate from social prejudices toward certain kinds of
interpersonal relationships: nonmarital, homosexual, and/or interracial. When pitted
against an issue of a moral or social transgression, testamentary intent often fails. In
order for these attacks on testamentary validity to succeed, they must be situated within
an existing juridical framework that supports and adheres to the hegemony of denial that
refuses to legitimate the wishes of the testator. Disinherited white relatives of white
testators regularly challenged wills disposing a majority of an estate to paramours and
children of African descent.
In the nineteenth century, testators who eschewed
traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves, or
both often incited will contests of testamentary incapacity, undue influence, or fraud.
This Article is a case study of In Re Remley, an antebellum will contest between
disinherited white collateral heirs and the intended black and mulatto devisees. It retains
timeless value in its demonstration of the incompatibility of testamentary freedom and
social deviance. I conclude that subjective conceptions of kinship, in particular those
unpopular relationships that defy social norms, prevent the idea of testamentary freedom
from reaching diverse articulations of family.
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Introduction
Death is a tragedy, but its aftermath can be a drama. In testamentary documents,
decedents leave a record of posthumous wishes regarding the distribution of their estate.
Such procedures nowhere approach anything legally extraordinary or exceptional—the
vast majority of wills exist as unremarkable death documents of little interest to anyone
but family members and acquaintances. Still, private conflicts often evince larger issues
than the mere distribution of property.1 They can reflect normative ideas about the
proper recognition of family and societal limitations on kinship.2 Will dramas, settled in
or out of court, bring unstated concerns and insecurities to the forefront, forcing a legal
articulation of objections to the nontraditional distribution.3 When pitted against an issue

* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University. I would like to thank Don Herzog and Anita Allen for
their thorough comments, and to various faculty colloquia and conferences at The American Society for
Legal History, New York Law School, Seton Hall University, and the Syracuse University College of Law
Junior Faculty Forum. Special thank you to Rachel Godsil and Annette Gordon-Reed for their elegant
insight.
1
For a through discussion of lawsuits over dispositions considered “unjust” or “unnatural,” see Susanna L.
Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth
Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 960 (2006).
2
Modern courts have strayed from basing family court decisions, namely custody battles, on private biases.
See, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (ruling that private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict are impermissible considerations for removal of a white child from the custody of its natural
mother who remarried a man of a different race).
3
See generally, Adrienne Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 221 (1999). See also, Mary Frances Berry, Mary Frances Berry, Judging Morality: Sexual
Behavior and Legal Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South, 78 J. OF AMER. HIST. 835-56
(1991), Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8:2 Raritan, Fall 1998, 39-69.
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of a moral or social transgression4, testamentary intent often fails.5 In order for these
attacks on testamentary validity to succeed, they must be situated within an existing
juridical framework that supports and adheres to the hegemony of denial that refuses to
legitimate the wishes of the testator.
Testamentary intent may enunciate a testator’s subjective interpretation of family,
yet these subjective expectations of distribution may confound a more restrictive
statutory scheme that is less permissive in its views of the parameters of kinship.6
Balancing the state’s interest in the efficient distribution of property with the testator’s
legal interest in bequeathing reveals an underexamined aspect of governmental regulation
of diverse expressions of family.7 In most cases, wills pass quickly though probate
because few challenges to the specific devises exist to slow and lengthen the probate
process. Few legal barriers exist that prevent a civil spouse and their children from being
considered as legitimate family members. It is the rarer and more diverse conceptions of
family that must overcome a presumption of illegitimacy, even when the words of the
testamentary document clearly indicate the familial role played by the disenfranchised.8
Legal attempts to recognize the validity of a nontraditional family propel diverse
conceptions of interpersonal relationships from margin to center.

Social norms of

acceptable and plausible relationships have traditionally thwarted a decedent’s attempt to

4

See, Susannah Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in
Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 960 (2006).
5
See generally, Melanie Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996).
6
Id. at 238 (discussing courts’ commitment to seeing that testators uphold a duty to family.)
7
Diverse expressions of family—unmarried heterosexual couples and also homosexual couples—find that
their expressions of commitment fail to receive the same easy protections of the heteronormative nuclear
family. For an excellent article exploring these restrictions on family, see Laura Rosenbury, Two Ways to
End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227 (2005).
8
See Leslie at 236 (refuting the “oft-repeated axiom that testamentary freedom is the polestar of wills
law”).
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circumvent well-established distribution schemes of probate law.9 Spouses may not
disinherit each other, and in some states, marital children have stronger claims upon an
estate than nonmarital children.10

Additionally, adopted children have the same

testamentary rights as biological children.11 Testators who want to disinherit their current
spouse, restrict their nonmarital children, or differentiate between adoptive and biological
children stand upon shallow legal ground, even under the ideology of testamentary
freedom. Equity, as defined by the state, intervenes to recalibrate the inefficient and
unfair distribution of estates.
Estate reformation according to principles of equity works in two ways. While it
is often true in will disputes that two sides exists to every story, state supported
restrictions that rein in testamentary freedom may tautologically disadvantage those
recognitions of family relationships that conflict with state public policy.12 On one hand,
statutory schemes protect vulnerable family members from predictable patterns of
disinheritance that disfavor neglected spouses13 and nonmarital, nonbiological children.14
Securing the inheritance interests of these frequently marginalized constituencies
institutes a norm of familial equality in estate succession by curtailing the actions of
testators who actively or constructively disinherit closely related family members. On the
other hand, these same statutory schemes remain underinclusive, as they may not provide
9

Id. Ralph Brashier offers a comprehensive examination of diverse families and the problems they face
with inheritance. See, R. Brashier, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004).
10
Id. at 12.
11
See, Susan Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (2000); Jan E.
Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why?, 37 VAND. L. REV.
711 (1984);
12
See supra note 9.
13
The Uniform Probate Code allows for spouses who were left out of a premarital will to recover the same
amount as an intestate share, with some exceptions. UPC §2-301. Additionally, all spouses displeased with
their share in a will may opt for an elective share, depending on the length of the marriage. UPC §2-202.
14
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional an Illinois statute prohibiting a
nonmarital child from inheriting from its biological father).
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legal protection for those infinitely diverse articulations of family and association that
exist beyond the comprehension and acceptance of the law.15
But the idea of the “changing American family” has perpetually been in flux, and
the only constant aspect has been the law’s recognition of a limited version of it.16
Marriage has long stood as the unifying characteristic of family, yet this venerable
institution has been subject to state control.17 It has prevented people of the same sex18
from legal consolidation of their interests, as well as interracial couples,19 related
people,20 minors,21 and slaves.22 Couples who fit the state’s conception of appropriate
prospective spouses receive state protection of their relationship and of their property.23
For those relationships existing outside of this realm of approval, securing these same
rights proved a remarkably difficult process. Concomitant with regulation of marriage is
the regulation of property transmission, and stringent controls on who can get married
necessarily dictates, in turn, who may inherit.24
The language of wills calls into question the authority of probate and family law
by forcing issues of deviance into the public realm.25 This Article addresses the deviance
15

See supra note 9.
See, ANITA BERNSTEIN, MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (2005).
17
See, Davis supra note 3 at fn15. See also, Milton Regan, Jr., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE
MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999).
18
David Chambers, What If: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of lesbian and Gay
Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447 (1996).
19
Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state statue prohibiting interracial
marriages). Despite the Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling, Alabama formally held on to antimiscegenation law
until the year 2000. Kevin Johnson, Taking The “Garbage” Out in Tulia, Texas: The Taboo on BlackWhite Romance and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs”, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 283, 300 (2007).
20
Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637 (1990) (voiding a marriage between a half-uncle and a half-niece).
21
Moe V. Dinkins 533 F.Supp 623 (1982). See also, Lynn Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions,
21 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).
22
See, Davis, supra note 3 at fn 9. Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1996) (summarizing effects of enslavement on
inheritance).
23
See, Brashier, supra note 9.
24
See generally, Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
25
Blumenthal at 966.
16
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of interracial sexuality acknowledged in testamentary documents. In addition to the
administrators, the will announces to others the sincerity of the testator’s interracial
wishes, and it formally acknowledges an interpretation of “family” not frequently and
willingly admitted as legitimate. Disinherited white relatives of white testators regularly
challenged wills disposing a majority of an estate to paramours and children of African
descent.26

In the nineteenth century, testators who eschewed traditional devises to

spouses, relatives, and institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves, or both often incited will
contests of testamentary incapacity, undue influence, or fraud.27 When social and legal
practices denied the existence and possibility of mixed race,28 the act of memorializing an
interracial connection in a legal document confounds this nonexistence. In the eyes of
the state, probating an interracial will that requests an acknowledgement of forbidden
love29 and its fruits threatens not only the authority of the law, but it also would permit
legal equality among blacks and whites. Interracial marriage brings with it interracial
property.
This specific case, In re Remley30, concerns the familiar antebellum taboo: what
Mary Boykin Chesnut called the “monstrous system” of miscegenation and slavery. This
case demonstrates the influence of racial privilege on the viability of testamentary
freedom. First, in 1861, a scheming relative accused her “white” and recently widowed
26

See Jason Gillmer, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 535, 597. See also, Bernie Jones, Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable
Old Men,” and “Degraded Creatures”: Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will
Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV. 699 (2005)
27
Blumenthal at 964.
28
Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multiracial Ephiphany, (forthcoming FORD. L. REV. 2008) (on file with
author)
29
Id.
30
These materials are located in the South Carolina Historical Society, where they previously sat unread in
the records of a nineteenth-century Charleston law firm, Rutledge and Young. I found no reference to the
Remley family in historical surveys or scholarly articles. Essentially, their existence fettered away with the
passage of time. Their name does exist, however, in the title of a local neighborhood, Remley’s Point,
which had once served as a Freedmen’s settlement, athletic complex, and now a site for luxury residential
development.
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cousin, Mary Remley, of being a black slave. If the cousin succeeded in her claim, Mary
and her children, as slaves, could not legally stand as beneficiaries of her deceased
husband’s will, thus enabling the cousin to inherit as the legitimate next of kin. With
their late father’s will at stake, the children successfully proved their untainted claim to
whiteness, which cleared any racial impediments to their inheritance.
Years later, these same children would revisit the interracial issue again upon the
death of their brother, Paul Durbin Remley, of Charleston, South Carolina. In his will, he
disinherited his sisters in favor of his black slave mistress, Philis, and their two children,
Charles and Cecile.31 His collateral heirs challenged the will on grounds of insane
delusion, arguing that the gunshot wound that precipitated his death rendered him
incapable of writing a valid will.32 Although the Civil War and emancipation predated
Durbin’s will, the sisters succeeded in characterizing Philis as the object of property
rather than its recipient. To them and to the courts, Philis was not an heir, but evidence
of the postwar devaluation of Durbin’s estate.33 Former slaves failed to meet the social
and legal requirements for “family.”
This historical approach to wills law demonstrates a legal antecedent for
contemporary lawmakers, scholars, and students contemplating the evolution of the
American family.34 Remley tests the elasticity of testamentary freedom. Using race as a
proxy to determine appropriate family relationships amongst the Remleys separates legal
reality from practical reality. While the law allowed whites to shield family property
31

From the time Durbin wrote the will until its execution, the black beneficiaries had been emancipated by
proclamation. See Paul Durbin Remley Will infra note 105.
32
Infra note 69.
33
Id.
34
Maillard, supra note 28. Diverse families have always existed in the United States, yet law has
prevented them from becoming legitimate forms of interpersonal expression, and in turn, more publicly
acknowledged. Law affects collective memory so that our vision of the past accedes to a vision of legal
possibilities and prohibitions.
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from the testamentary interests of potential black heirs, this tells a very different story
from the lived experiences of the people whose very existences challenged the boundaries
of race—and impacted the decisions of the testator. Legal narratives painted a picture of
a white family untainted by intimate connections with persons of color, thus limiting the
number of people who could call themselves legitimate members of the family. Social
reality, however, reveals a complexity of interpersonal and interracial relationships not
explained in rigid laws.35
Even though the time and place of In re Remley appears remote from our own, it
retains timeless value in its demonstration of the incompatibility of testamentary freedom
and social deviance. Devises left to unorthodox heirs face additional levels of scrutiny
even in the face of plain language indicating intent of inheritance.36

Section One

discusses South Carolina’s unique racial climate, providing a political background for the
case study which follows in Section Two. Here, I introduce the case of Mary Remley, a
white widow accused of being a black slave. In the challenge to this claim, which
threatened her children’s inheritance of their father’s will, race is employed as a deterrent
to free inheritance. The last Section looks at the younger Remley son’s bequest to a
black slave and their two children. In this conflict, race shifts from a disqualifier to an
indicator of the limits of family when his sisters contested the will. Finally, I conclude
that subjective conceptions of kinship, in particular those unpopular relationships that

35

Mary Boykin Chesnut’s diary reveals the conflict between public oblivion and private knowledge of the
interracial sexuality of the slave system:
God forgive us, but ours is a monstrous system and wrong and iniquity....Like the patriarchs of old
our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in
every family exactly resemble the white children - and every lady tells you who is the father of all
the mulatto children in everybody's household, but those in her own she seems to think drop from
the clouds…
Davis, supra note 3 fn 286.
36
See Leslie, supra note 5.
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defy social norms, prevent the idea of testamentary freedom from reaching diverse
articulations of family.

II.

Miscegenation in South Carolina

B. Legal Pliancy of Race in South Carolina
Miscegenation existed as a given fact in each of the slave states. In his
comprehensive study on American mulattoes, Joel Williamson comments, if Freud was
only generally correct, “it is safe to assume that the lines of lust in the old South ran
continually and in all directions.”37 Slavemasters, as possessors of people as property,
usurped these claims to fulfill their libidinous desires. The concubinage of black women
by white men formed the majority of interracial relations, although unions between black
men and white women were not unknown.38 A northern traveler in South Carolina
commented, “The enjoyment of a Negro or mulatto woman is spoken of as quite a
common thing; no reluctance, delicacy, or shame is made about the matter.”39 The
forgiving climate for race mixing hinged on an explanation of miscegenation as a safe
harbor for the wanton desires of red-blooded white men free to “Imbibe the Blackness of
the Charmer’s Skin,” as noted in an 18th century Charleston periodical.40

37

JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MULATTOES AND MISCEGENATION IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (New
York, 1980).
38
Although this aspect of miscegenation deserves mention, it goes beyond the scope of this project. For a
comprehensive examination of this nexus of race and gender, see MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK
MEN, infra note 102. I am primarily concerned with the darkening of wealth, that is, mulatto inheritance
from white kin, which concerns the transfer of property from white men to mixed race offspring. See also
ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW 16-19 (Albuquerque 1972) (explaining sexual stereotypes
of black men and white women).
39
WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 145
(Chapel Hill, 1968).
40
Quoted in CHARLESTON S-C GAZETTE, March 11, 1732, in Jordan, supra note 39 at 146.
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The rituals of bedroom integration faced no formal obstructions to extending the
temporary physical relation into a significant romantic liaison. Surely, feelings of love
and attraction developed as undocumented relationships between mistress and master,41
but other interracial couples formalized their connection by law. Unlike other states,
South Carolina did not prohibit interracial marriage until after the Civil War and in
Charleston occasional marriages occurred between persons of color and well-regarded
whites.

The state suspended the prohibition in 1868, only to reenact it in 1879.42

Although Loving v. Virginia43 rendered all antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, the
state retained the law in its books until 1999.44
Perhaps this liberality extended from powerful white judges who vehemently
opposed a concrete definition of racial boundaries. In South Carolina’s high court,
Justice William Harper45 set a notorious precedent that influenced his successors’ rulings
on racial classification. Ruling on two cases in 1831 that set a legal precedent for the
fluidity of the color line, Harper eschewed the common southern practice of fractional
41

Interracial relations between free white men and enslaved black women generate a host of reactions
addressing the nature and/or possibility of consent. Many scholars would argue that slave status precludes
any form of consent and a loving relationship, thus making all liaisons between free men and slave women
rape. Others may view the relationships as mutually beneficial, with black women acceding to these
relationships in search of better futures for themselves and their children. Analyzing the consensual
possibilities of these relationships goes beyond the scope of this article, but I do believe it would be
overinclusive and anachronistic to forestall a possibility of mutual interracial attraction. See, Davis, supra
note 3 at n10 (citing Eugene Genovese’s analysis of master-slave relationships beginning as exploitation
and turning into love).
42
See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 75-6
(New York, 2003); PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND
LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 103-4 (2002).
43
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
44
S.C. Const. Ann. Art. III, 33 (2003)
45
Other scholars have discussed Harper’s curious defenses of slavery and also miscegenation. See, Daniel
Sharfstein, Crossing The Color Line: Racial Migration And The One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 592, 628 (2007) (nothing that Harper’s “jurisprudence fostered a permeable color line, [but he]
lectur[ed] extensively in favor of slavery”); Mitchell Crusto, Blackness As Property: Sex, Race, Status, And
Wealth, 1 STAN. J. CIV. R & CIV. LIB 51, 84 (2005) (characterizing Harper as turning interracial sex “into a
virtue”); Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited And Demystification As A Critical
Practice, 18 YALE LAW AND POLICY REV., 297, 318 (2000) (describing Harper’s rejection of the visual
paradigm of race).
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genealogy for an interpretive approach to racial designation. In his appellate decisions on
State v. Davis and State v. Hanna, he wrote that,
There is considerable difficulty in laying down an exact rule on this
subject, and it may not perhaps be necessary to do so. There is no legal
definition of the term [mulatto]. The popular definition in this State, by
which we must be governed, seems to be vague, signifying, generally, a
person of mixed white, or European, and Negro descent, in whatever
proportions the blood may be mixed. The distinctions which have
obtained in the French and Spanish American colonies, and in our sister
State of Louisiana, in relation to persons of mixed European and Negro
blood, have not been admitted in this state.46
Setting a widely-cited precedent, Justice Harper denounced a legal definition of race.47
This stance toward Negro law in the state classified many persons as white when other
slave states would classify them as mulatto. This vague interpretation primarily relied on
physical appearance48 instead of descent, recognizing that “every admixture of African
blood with the European, or white, is not to be referred to the degraded class.”49
It is important to note that hypodescent50, or the “one drop rule,” claims no place
in South Carolina’s antebellum legal history. The existence of a single African ancestor
in a person’s genealogy did not always classify one in the lower caste. Lawmakers were
keenly aware of miscegenation’s extent, and they probably knew that the relentless hunt
for black ancestry could have destroyed the reputation of many white persons. Perhaps
these lawmakers realized that the establishment of the one-drop rule could have struck
46

8 S.C. Eq. 559 (Bail. Eq.) (1831).
See Westley, supra note 45 at 318.
48
Appearance has been adjudicated in other contexts to be an unreliable characteristic of race. See Rich,
infra note 50.
49
Id.
50
See, Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry
from Racial Purity Law 12 MICH J RACE & L 351, 354, (2007) (analyzing different applications of the onedrop rule to Native Americans and African-Americans); Rachel Moran, Loving and the Legacy of
Unintended Consequences, 2007 WISC. L. REV. 239, 244; Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial And
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination By Proxy And The Future Of Title Vii, 79 NYU L. REV. 1134, 1150 (2004);
Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1731 (2000); Donald
Braman, Of Race and Immutability 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1397 (1999).
47
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close to home, and possibly create a “very cruel and mischievous” situation.51 To ward
off potential destructions of racial reputation, judges remained silent on genealogical
exactions.

B. Race as a Factor of Reputation, not Ancestry
Justice Harper’s insistence on the fluidity of whiteness relied on the recollection
of the past of claimants and their peers in the determination of race. Even with proof of
African ancestry, South Carolina courts still declared some persons as white.52 In State v.
Cantey in 1835,53 objectors challenged the legitimacy of two white-appearing witnesses
to testify in an indictment for larceny. Nonwhite persons were not allowed to serve as
witnesses or jurors, and worried defendants sometimes attempted to paint key witnesses
as racially questionable in order to block their incriminating testimony. The witnesses in
Cantey, as brothers, had a white father, and their mother was a “descendent in the third
degree of a half breed who had a white wife.”54 An extraordinary history of white
acceptance had run long in their family. Interestingly enough, their maternal grandfather,
described as a dark-skinned man, held the reputation of a white man, and one of their
relatives of the same “admixture” married into a wealthy white family and ran for the
state legislature. The court found the witnesses as one-sixteenth black, in opposition to
their reputation in the community as white. Seeing that remote African ancestry did not

51

JAMES HUGO JOHNSTON, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION IN THE SOUTH 205
(Kingsport, 1970).
52
Reputation and race in the antebellum south were often interdependent, allowing people with African
ancestry to be legally considered white. See generally Marie-Amelie George, The Modern Mulatto: A
Comparative Analysis of the Social and Legal Positions of Mulattoes in the Antebellum South and the
Intersex in Contemporary America, 15 COL. J. GENDER & L. 665 (2006); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown:
The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000).
53
11 S.C. Eq. 614 (2 Hill Eq.) (1835).
54
Id.
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disturb their reputation as white, Justice Harper dismissed the case, apologizing for the
“unnecessary violence” to the gentlemen.
Even though the evidence proved the witnesses’ African descent, the court
secured their reputations as white citizens. Harper disregarded the existence of African
ancestry as the sole determinant for membership in a race group. Describing a person
with no visible mixture of black blood, he remarked “it would be an absurdity in terms to
say that such an one is, in the popular sense of the word, a person of color.”55 With this
logic, Harper argued for reputation rather than ancestry, and he insisted that one’s
establishment within the white caste secured that classification.
The condition of the individual is not to be determined solely by the
distinct and visible mixture of negro blood, but by reputation, by his
reception into society, and his having commonly exercised the privileges
of a white man. But his admission to these privileges, regulated by the
public opinion of the community in which he lives, will very much depend
on his own character and conduct; and it may be well and proper that a
man of worth, honesty, industry, and respectability, should have the rank
of a white man, while a vagabond of the same degree of blood should be
confined to the inferior caste.56
This interpretation granted the visibly black grandfather of the witnesses the legal status
as white, because he exerted the privileges of free white citizens. Thus was the beginning
of a social definition of race, determined by racial alliances and public opinion instead of
being handed down at birth.
Another case in St. Paul’s Parish illustrates the legal negations of race, reputation,
and memory.

In Johnson v. Brown (1842), a tax collector attempted to collect a

capitation tax from two fair-skinned brothers, Thomas and Henry Johnson, as mulattoes.
In antebellum times, the state kept track of and profited from the free Negro population

55
56

Id. at 615.
Id.

14

by taxing each person.57 The brothers objected, declaring themselves free white men, and
they allowed themselves to be inspected by the jury. The court reporter remarked, “On
inspection, I thought Thomas and John very passable white men. Thomas, particularly,
had light or sandy hair, and a sunburnt complexion. John was a darker man, black hair,
and a skin of a darker shade than his brother.”58 The court also called in witnesses who
testified that the community sometimes regarded the men as colored, other times as not.
They did possess voting rights, but in one instance, an acquaintance extracted their
ballots from the voting box and scratched their names off the list of registered voters.
The jury did not inspect the brothers’ family, rationalizing that “color…was a deceptive
test.”59 Finding that classifying the Johnson brothers as black would represent “bad
policy,” the jury “very properly” classified them as white.60
These cases raise a question of the link between genetics and memory.
Considering that judges like Harper allowed reputation to trump ancestry, the legal act of
determining race depended heavily on the factfinder’s interpretation of the defendant’s
reputation as white. It appears that in each of these cases, the defendants all possess a
detectable quantity of African blood.

The court opinions make no secret of this

knowledge, although they do mention that the defendants carefully selected their guests,
witnesses, and relatives to appear in the courtroom. Suspiciously dark relatives remained
at large. Despite the existence of black ancestry, the courts entirely dispensed with black
blood as the sole determinant of racial membership. In this rejection of genetics, the
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court not only sets a new standard for race, but it also refuses to settle upon a steadfast
bar for blackness and ancestral minimums.61
Reputation cases, infrequent in number, left race to the mercy of the judge’s gavel
or to the approval of the community. Harper shared the intellectual opinion of Judge
Frost, who in White v. Tax Collector (1846), argued that a strict adherence to a legal
definition of white and black did not provide a reliable measurement of citizenship.
Judge Frost, in his rulings, accounted for “honesty, sobriety, and industry, and the
qualities that unite in a respectable character” in perceiving whiteness.62

Like his

counterpart, Frost refused to establish a doctrine of racial determination, insisting that it
“be decided by public opinion, expressed in the verdict of a jury.”63

This stance

entertains community estimations of race by taking personal identity from the jurisdiction
of the individual and auctioning it off in the courts. The way that others remembered or
perceived a person, not what the person thought of him/herself, became the legal standard
for racial classification.
But courts did not completely dispense with genealogical evidence. In some
cases, reputation could not supplant ancestry. Martha White, an educated teacher married
to a white man, exercised the same “good character and correct deportment” as a white
woman, and enjoyed the accompanying rights and privileges.64

Yet, Martha’s

appearance, which Judge Frost described as “obviously a colored person,” precluded her
free assimilation, which he would have approved had she lacked the telltale features of
taint. This example demonstrates the whimsical nature of classification: Mrs. White is
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“colored,” but her children were “white; she married, lived, and socialized as white, and
held this reputation in her community.”65 Yet, the court, showing its mercurial nature,
still classified her, but not her children, as mulatto.66

II. Using Race as a Deterrent
The story of the Remley family is remarkable because it illustrates how external
pressures simultaneously threaten and bolster their status as a family. Depending on the
angle, law acts both to exclude and include, and the ability to utilize law to their best
advantage turns on their secure claim to whiteness. The common link of blood that tied
the Remleys—black, white, or possibly mulatto—to each other did not automatically
enable a fluid and free conception of family. For those who were able to claim the legal
privileges of whiteness, they employed law to restrict the economic benefits of family
membership to exclude those who could not.
Paul Remley, a free white man, died in Charleston in November of 1860.67 He
left his wife, Mary Remley, a farm in Pennsylvania consisting of “19.5 acres of poor land
but healthy with two small storm houses on it, no farm buildings, one old shed.”68 He
appointed his son, Paul Durbin Remley (“Durbin”) as administrator of the estate, and the
younger Remley assumed charge on December 1, 1860.69

Widowed, Mrs. Remley

assumed possession of the farm from November 29 until her death three years later. In
the following summer of 1861, Durbin filed for a grant of administration of his father’s
65
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will. In this capacity, he was expected to share the profits of the estate with his siblings:
Elizabeth Hubbell (née Remley) and Emma Remley. At this time, the siblings were
dispersed along the eastern seaboard, with Durbin residing in Charleston and the sisters in
Pennsylvania.

C. The Accusation of Mary Shrine
A conflict arose when Durbin applied for the grant on June 3, 1861—the same
day that a challenger questioned his legitimacy as an administrator.

Mary Shrine,

claiming to be his second cousin, filed a complaint in a Charleston Court of Ordinary
alleging herself to be a legitimate next of kin.70 Durbin and his sisters, she alleged, were
rendered ineligible due to the status of their mother. Mrs. Shrine filed an affidavit which
argued that “the supposed widow of Paul Remley is a colored person” and that “she was
purchased by said Paul Remley as a slave.”71 Due to this social incapacity, she attempted
to position herself as having not only a superior claim on the estate, but the only
legitimate entitlement to distribution. If she proved Mary Remley as a slave, then her
grown children would follow her diminished status; Paul, Elizabeth, and Emma would
immediately become slaves, and ineligible to stand as legal heirs.72
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Mary Shrine based her argument on South Carolina’s 1841 Act to Prevent the
Emancipation of Slaves.73 This Act prohibited testamentary emancipations, and it also
voided all bequests to slaves. Section IV reads, “That every devise or bequest, to a slave
or slaves, or to any person, upon a trust or confidence, secret or expressed, for the benefit
of any slave or slaves, shall be null and void.”74 Even if the Remleys had considered
themselves free white persons, the possibility of a hidden condition of their mother
threatened their ability to inherit their father’s estate. Legal definitions of children’s
status throughout the South followed Roman law by declaring partus sequitur ventrem—
that children followed the condition of the mother.75 It must be pointed out, however,
that race did not serve as a constant determinant of status. For children with parents of
different races, the mother could be black or mulatto and pass her free status to her child.
Likewise, children of black or mulatto slave fathers and free white women, while very
few in number, retained free status, despite their father’s condition. These distinctions
mattered, as this would not only come to court as a race versus reputation case, but a
legal determination of one’s basic rights.
The accusation of diminished legal and racial status, however farfetched,
generated a flurry of representations of Remley family history. The competing claims to
the status of Mary Remley, who offered no voice in the available correspondence,
demonstrate a flurry of legal panic in the race to reassert the primacy of whiteness and
freedom. If the Remley children followed the condition of their mother, not only would
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they lose testamentary and legal standing, but also their public reputations as free white
persons.
In an effort to bolster their legitimacy, the Remleys offered testimony from
“respectable” white persons to verify their freedom and race. These narrative
contributions necessarily referred to the past, offering a subjective view of Mary
Remley’s standing in the community. These acts of remembering had legal and practical
relevance, but they also reasserted the Remley family as white, privileged citizens. In
reconstructing their racial identity by means of community opinion, the family followed a
well-established precedent.

Whether these claims were made public outside the

protection of the court remains unknown, but the singular assertion and multiple
refutations as documented in the legal records commemorate a type of juridical
discussion of sexual and racial privacy that was routinely relegated beyond the scope of
public discourse.
The Remley “defendants,” like any party in litigation, selectively remembered
advantageous facts and omitted pejorative ones. Soon after the supposed cousin filed the
accusatory affidavit in the Court of Ordinary, the Remley party called upon Sam Wagner,
a free white man and a churchgoing citizen of Charleston, to verify Mrs. Remley’s
whiteness. As a member of Bethel Methodist Church, Mr. Wagner testified that Mr. and
Mrs. Remley were “always recognized as white persons in the use of all the privileges of
the Church”76 He continues by attesting to their status as “acceptable members” and
active “Class Leaders.”

Unmentioned in this written testimony are references to

miscegenation or slavery. Mr. Wagner’s narrative limits itself to public interpretations of
racial identity.
76
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origins, focusing instead on Mr. Remley’s secure status as a free white man and Mrs.
Remley’s white father. Additionally, he remains silent on the Church’s significant black
and mulatto members, who at that time constituted the majority of Charleston’s black
Methodists, approximately 6,000 in number.77
Characterizing the allegation as a “question of Pedigree and legitimacy,”78 the
Court of Ordinary postponed the decision of grant in order to accommodate the
contestant Mrs. Shrine by allocating one week for her to provide corroborating testimony.
When she failed to prove the slavery claim, the Court found Durbin legally competent to
administer his father’s estate. In the absence of supporting evidence from Mrs. Shrine
regarding the truth of her accusation, Wagner’s sole opposing affidavit proved sufficient
to defeat the objection to Durbin’s grant of administration.

The Court qualified this

ruling, however, by distinguishing legitimacy for administration from legitimacy for
distribution. Noting that the possible truth of Shrine’s claim would not greatly affect the
pending grant, the Court added “altho it may become so in a progress of settlement of
assets of said Estate.”79
Legally, the Court’s finding voided the issue, but the family continued to discuss
the “great annoyance and mortification.”80 In correspondence and memoranda, Elizabeth
Hubbell continued to refute the claims of race and slavery, writing from Philadelphia to
her brother Durbin “a very long epistle” chronicling their family’s history of
respectability and whiteness.81

Mrs. Hubbell’s pride prevents her from explicitly
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addressing the assault to her family’s racial identity, telling her brother that “the
astonishment the thing has occasioned may be better imagined than described.”82 To her
knowledge, their father was “not the man to lower himself by such a degrading act as is
alleged.”83 She viewed these charges as a “conspiracy” organized by “low people” who
unjustifiably wanted to deprive the Remley children of their inheritance. In desperation,
Hubbell expressed her conviction that the “whole thing [was] gotten up by some of
[Durbin’s] enemies,” notwithstanding the “[un]intelligent” Mrs. Shrine whose “Mother
was subject to some sort of fits.”84

D. Remembering Racial Security
Elizabeth Hubbell takes an adversarial stance in her letters, which makes these
documents a source of critical interpretation. It could be true that writing letters served as
an outlet for her racial frustrations, but they also advocate a biased conception of her
family’s racial identity. Hubbell draws on interactions her mother had with other whites
to suggest that Mrs. Remley could not have been anything other than white. Looking
backward to the past for explanation, she draws upon unquestioned relationships to
justify her own self-identity and that of her mother. Similar to the reconstructions of
history invoked by Chesnutt’s Aunt Polly and Faulkner’s Miss Rosa, she becomes the
architect of her family’s history by realigning the past to justify her present needs. In the
same way that the fictional characters recite the past as they wish to see it, they believe
the stories they sow themselves so that alternative conceptions become fallacious
invasions on their racial freedom and status. Elizabeth’s manner of imposing meaning
82
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upon the past makes it her own, rather than Mrs. Shrine’s, whom she insists has no
tenable claim on her family’s racial standing. Even if Hubbell’s labor of remembering
finds ground in unstable sources, she appropriates a verisimilitude to her past that may be
at odds with historical truths.85
Three primary examples of lived whiteness form her grounds for remembering
her family as white. First, she recalls that her mother was registered at the multiracial
Bethel Methodist Church in Charleston as a “free white person,” a demonstrative fact
which she interprets as conclusive proof. “[H]ad there been any doubt of the fact,” she
writes, “I imagine her name could not have been entered there.”86 Her reliance on the
church’s record of its members does not account for the possibility of errors in
representation, similar to simple and learned mistakes of census takers.87 Second, her
mother’s wedding to her father at Bethel serves as proof of their supposedly
irreproachable whiteness. She maintains that her mother’s bridesmaids were “ladies of
respectability” who would not be “intimate with a person of doubtful pretensions.”
Elizabeth blindly accepts a tautology of race and reputation that equates “respectability”
with whiteness and freedom and “doubtful pretensions” with blackness and slavery. Her
logic assumes an if/then calculation that makes reputation a barometer of racial identity:
“If she had been purchased and held as a slave all these things could not have been.”88
Here, she constructs her own memory according to permissible instances of monoracial
85
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interaction, thus negatively gleaning identity from interpretations of what things were
not. Lastly, she turns to her mother’s parentage and upbringing, noting that her mother’s
mother was an orphan, “brought up by strangers.” Her mother’s father, of Jacksonboro,
South Carolina, “was of a respectable family, scarcely likely to intermarry with a low
person.”89 Because Hubbell could not rely upon antimiscegenation law to prove that her
parents’ marriage was not illegal or interracial (i.e. that her parents were both white), she
had no other options outside of reputation and respectability to demonstrate that her
mother was not a black slave.
Elizabeth Hubbell’s husband William rushed to his wife’s defense by composing
a memorandum to his attorney that traced the ancestry of his wife’s mother.90 He too
employed an equation of race and reputation to dismiss Shrine’s claims. Polite white
persons marry and consort with persons like themselves. Mrs. Remley married a decent
white man, and kept company with proper white Charlestonians. Therefore, Mrs. Remley
must be white. He fortifies this logic with genealogical information about her parents
Thomas and Leah Whitley, offering additional evidence to his wife’s rendition. Thomas
Whitley, he argues, came from an English family of “respectable noble descent,” which
he attests to be listed in Burke’s Peerage of Landed Gentry.91 Leah, on the other hand, he
portrays as a daughter of a fallen soldier of the Revolutionary War and a woman of
unknown origins. Remarkably, he does not question any deeper meaning or possibility of
89
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“unknown.”

Still, this liaison of high and low, noble and plebian produced “an

exemplary moral and Christian woman” who with her husband, operated a well-known
grocery store in Charleston.
Although Elizabeth and William’s accounts of Remley family history fervently
denounce what they judge as “hatred, slander, perjury and conspiracy,” their
reconstructions of the past do not exactly mirror each other. William’s discussion of
Thomas and Leah Whitley extols their mercantile skills and civic respectability. He also
emphasizes Thomas Whitley’s English family as “not of common or feudal descent.”92
His flattering rendition sharply contrasts with Elizabeth’s, which, in the letter to Durbin,
confesses “of course our Grandparents were poor.”93 She paints a darker picture of her
forebears, relaying tales of a bankrupt and “intemperate” husband who had lost
everything during the Revolutionary War. His wife, who carried their grocery business
during his bouts of depression, left him, joining her son in Massachusetts, who she had
previously sent away “to keep him out of the way of bad example.”94 These different
interpretations

demonstrate

the

effect

of

audience

awareness

in

persuasive

correspondence. Although renditions of historical memory do not have to make narrative
concessions in order to maintain credibility, Elizabeth’s letter to her brother assumed a
candid tone, revealing potentially shameful family intimacies. She did not intend for it to
be used in a court of law—rather she vented her personal frustrations into a written
narrative that memorializes her shock, pain, and disbelief in the fragility of her racial
identity. She risks less in this private note by telling her brother of the full circle of their
family history.

Her double-sided rendition actually makes her arguments more
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believable, as the full inclusion of all stories, proud and less proud, indicates the
unlikelihood of consciously selective historical memory.

The dialectic of Elizabeth’s

flattering and unfavorable recitations lend authenticity to her claims, but they do not
unquestionably clear the Remleys from the taint of blackness.
William’s one-sided letters and memorandum memorialize his contrivance of the
family past. His renditions appear to have juridical utility, as he supplies the attorney to
which the letter is directed with possible arguments for dismissing Shrine’s allegations.
Short on emotion, he turns instead to outcome-oriented methods of attack. Like Mr.
Carteret in Chesnutt’s Marrow, the husband eagerly seeks to establish a whitewashed
past. In this way of bantering about the subject, William Hubbell consciously constructs
the past in a manner that creates a desired outcome. He presents the intermediary facts
(according to his memory) that carry the story from start to finish. In examining his
renditions, we realize a prime example of contrived historical memory. As an in-law
rather than a descendant, William could not have been present at any of the events that he
discusses. He also is unfamiliar with many of the parties in these stories, yet he assumes
a narrative authority in representing a family history as an unquestionable, irreproachable
fact.
Mr. Hubbell’s rendition offers a radically different explanation for Mrs. Remley’s
alleged status. Although he has never met the accuser or her informant, Mary Mitchell, he
surmises that Mitchell’s accusation, which she conveyed to Shrine, who conveyed it to
the Court, derives from spite, jealousy, or hate. He claims that Leah Whitley, before her
marriage to Thomas, jilted Joseph Mitchell, who in turn married Mary Mitchell, the
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informant.95 Embittered by a prolonged two years of rejection, Mitchell maliciously told
others that Leah was a “colored slave.” Presumably, William has no personal knowledge
of these events, seeing that Mrs. Shrine was previously unknown to him. However, his
knowledge suffices to align the past with a respectable script of Southern racial purity
and social status that discards the incursive and unfounded greed of “ignorant low
people.”96
Aligning history with contemporary claims necessitates an active remembering of
the past. Both Elizabeth and her husband William created lively renditions of the Remley
past in order protect their testamentary legitimacy. It seems that Mrs. Shrine’s claim
never penetrated the veil of believability for either the Court or the Remleys, but her
farfetched claim provides an illuminating script to analyze the use of race as an qualifier
of standing for inheritance. These personal manipulations of history demonstrate how
silence and embellishment characterize the labor of historical remembrance.

III. Race and the Limits of Family
At the same time that Elizabeth’s panicked letter recorded her fear of the threat of
miscegenation, her brother Paul Remley maintained a mixed race family of his own in
Charleston. Elizabeth’s and William’s separate letters did not allude to this fact, which
generates two possibilities. First, the Hubbells, due to geographical separation from the
younger Paul, could simply have remained unaware of his miscegenous liaison. From the
tone expressed in her letter, she did not couch or soften her views of interracial sex,
which she described as “degrading” and “low.” If she did hold concerns about her
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brother’s feelings, perhaps she would not have expressed such untrammeled hostility
toward a type of relationship which her own brother supported. From another view, her
enmity toward Shrine and her accusations could precisely cut at Durbin’s family. In
finding a subject to channel her frustrations and convictions, she demonstrates her
disapproval of miscegenation to her brother without explicit mention of his own
transgressions. Most likely, this latter interpretation is correct, as later correspondence
proves Elizabeth’s knowledge.
Apparently, Durbin lived a quiet life as a wealthy planter in the Carolina
Lowcountry. Few, if any, texts of state history record his name as a prominent figure in
Southern politics, agricultural affairs, or Charleston society.

At the time he applied to

administer his father’s will in 1861, he lived on a plantation known as Remley’s Point in
the Charleston District. On this 305 acre plot situated in Christ Church Parish at the
junction of the Cooper and Wando Rivers,97 Paul D. Remley lived with his slave Philis
and their two children (Appendix 2). Durbin also owned a brick house and lot on Society
Street in downtown Charleston, which was a common practice for wealthy planters in the
Carolina Lowcountry.98 These two properties, along with other uninhabited town lots,99
demonstrate his economic comfort. State records show that he bought and sold slaves
fairly regularly.100
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No official bill of purchase exists for the slave Philis, but census records loosely
provide an understanding of who she was. In 1861, she would have been approximately
18 years old, the mother of a seven-year old son Charles, and pregnant with her daughter
Cecile.101 The 1870 census lists both her and Cecile as “black” rather than “mulatto,” so
we may assume that Philis and her daughter were of sufficiently dark complexion as to
lead the census taker to classify them as of unmixed blood. This declaration contrasts
with her private life, where she lived at Remley’s Point. As the slave mistress of Paul D.
Remley, she tacitly assumed the role of wife and paramour, as he remained unmarried
throughout his life. As the mother of his only two children, Philis claimed a distinct role
at Remley’s Point. Nominally a slave but almost a wife, she assumed an ambiguous role
of partner and servant not unknown to women of color in the antebellum South.102
Interracial sex and cohabitation existed in the antebellum South within unspoken
codes of behavior. Durbin could maintain Philis and their children at his plantation with
impunity because her slave status eviscerated any claim of legitimacy on their sexual
relationship. Even though South Carolina law allowed for interracial marriage, it applied
to free blacks only, thus preventing the legal legitimization of miscegenous relationships
between master and slave. Slavery precluded any legally recognized relationships, thus
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securing the sexual freedom of white men. Furthermore, Durbin and Philis did not
challenge what Adrienne Davis has termed the Southern “sexual economy”103 by
flaunting their relationship in public, according to the available records.

D. Durbin’s Death
Yet Durbin would show his appreciation for this relationship upon his death. He
died on December 25, 1863 while hunting, which Philis describes in a letter as “the
discharge of his Gun by shooting marsh hens in company with Major Bolks and John
Antley the ball entered his lungs of which he survived 13 days after being shot[.]”104 In
his will, he provided for his slave-widow and their children an annuity of $500 per year,
to be paid from the sales of his property both real and personal (See Appendix 3).105 He
also bequeathed “his Negroes,” meaning Philis, Charles, and Cecile, to a friend “to have
the labor and services of the said slaves and their issue for and during his natural life.”106
Durbin did not intend to relegate his family to a state of abject slavery, but to place them
“under the control of kind and indulgent owners, who will, whenever the law permits
manumit and make them free.”107
South Carolina courts frequently tried such issues. In Fable & Franks v. Brown, a
white man established a trust in his will for his two “illegitimate coloured children by a
female slave.”108 The plaintiffs, claiming to be the next of kin of the testator, objected to
the will, claiming that such bequests to slaves were invalid.
103
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approved the bequest on its face, upholding the testator’s wishes. As a caveat, however,
the court compared the man’s will to the freedom of providing posthumous support for a
favorite pet or object, saying, “Die and endow, a college or a cat.”109 Even though the
court validated the will, the property reverted to the state, because slaves, as property,
could not inherit.
Durbin’s scheme differs, however, because of timing, thus allowing
circumvention of the legal prohibition on slave bequests and manumissions. He did not
leave his property to his slave family directly, but to an administrator to carry out his
wishes. In this testamentary trust, his family would receive the interest resulting from the
state of his personal property that he could not leave to them directly because they were
slaves.110 Additionally, he did not manumit the slaves in his will, but he allowed for its
possibility in the future, but at the time of probate, this issue was moot. Had the will
been executed while Phillis and the children remained slaves, the court may have
followed Fable.
Durbin’s semantics of slavery in his will deserves further scrutiny. Although
Philis argues that she and her children had been emancipated by the time he wrote his
will, he nevertheless referred to them as though they were slaves. Had he left them
property directly, he would have placed their interests in jeopardy considering that the
1841 prohibition on slave bequests had yet to be overturned.111 Additionally, he did not
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free them in the will, but he expressed the hope that their new owners would manumit
them “whenever the law permits.”112 Although the Emancipation Proclamation affected
many states, it did not necessarily free all slaves in South Carolina, and all slaves,
regardless of residence, were freed by the 13th Amendment in 1865. In referring to them
as slaves, Durbin captures a memory of them as favored and faithful servants instead of
beloved and deserving family members. In this move, he formally maintains distance
between himself and Philis, thus underscoring a Southern code of racial propriety.
Durbin’s goodwill toward his black family makes a strong statement as to his
parental allegiances. Although he does not acknowledge his children as his blood, his
testamentary wishes clearly state his economic concerns for his family, and he
memorializes his intimacy with Philis in a legal document that leaves little room for
alternative explanations. He expressed a desire to sell his property “to be appropriated
for the use, clothing and comfort in sickness and health” for her and the children.113 In
this document, he rejects the interests of his collateral white heirs, which he noticeably
refrains from mentioning until the end of the will. In this devise, he leaves his residual
estate to his mother Mary Remley, and upon her death to his sister Emma. In no place in
the will does he mention his sister Elizabeth Hubbell.
The Remley case stands apart from other interracial inheritance cases because of
the prevalent influence of the Civil War. Durbin’s will remained untouched for three
years after his death, which coincides with the war’s end.

Presumably, hostilities
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between the Union and the Confederacy deterred not only the rapid administration of
wills, but also communications between North and South. Correspondence amongst
multiregional families such as the Remleys dissipated to such an extent that years passed
without hearing news from relatives in distant places. This case is no exception, and
postwar letters circulated amongst the family demonstrate delayed notifications of salient
events.

In the period between Durbin’s death and the subsequent litigation, the

transformations of war raise this standard yet mildly transgressive postmortem
distribution to a juridical exercise of reconstructing the past.
The end of the Civil War left the Hubbells and the Remleys in remarkably
different epistemological standpoints. In Philadelphia, Elizabeth R. Hubbell and her
husband persisted in their objection to Mrs. Shrine’s attack on their race and freedom.
William Hubbell retained the rebuttal letter he wrote in 1861, in sight of securing his
wife’s share in the elder Remley’s will, which was distributed at that time. A subsequent
note attached to Hubbell’s letter verifies that it was “not sent on account of hostilities
proceeding.”114 During this same period, Mrs. Mary Remley died intestate—news which
did not reach Charleston until after the war. On April 12 and May 20, 1865—soon after
General Robert. E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox—the sisters Emma and Elizabeth
wrote their brother in Charleston to inform him of their mother’s death in 1863. Equally
heartbreaking events in Charleston would add to the family’s wartime losses.
Correspondence from Charleston completes the cycle of belated information
about uncommunicated family episodes. As proxy for Durbin, Philis responds to the
sisters on June 1, 1865, with her own tragic news of Durbin’s death. In this response, she
conveys a sense of loneliness, despair, and depression. On both sides of the envelope, in
114
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Philadelphia and Charleston, initial and remembered reactions to family members’ deaths
illustrate subjective representations of the past that spark a frenzy of responses. Most
notably, each of these death notices did not intend to stir up controversy—rather, they
aimed to inform the reader of a family loss and to inaugurate a forum for mutual
sympathy and mourning. In turn, these letters initiated legal battles.
Philis’s letter sparks a chain of events that leads to the eventual dispute over
inheritance. In this correspondence, she conveys an intimacy with Durbin that alludes to
mutual intimacy. A full two years after his death, she recalls:
My Dear Mistress the morning of which he died was Christmas on that
Morning he Called me to wash him saying that he felt so much better and
said that he did not think that his mother was alive and was Desirous of
seeing his sisters also he said on the Morning that Christmas Morning was
a Mourning Day to the Family which after he called on me to give Him
the Bible to read of which I did & said that he was thankful to God for his
Mercies towards Him to spare his life to see that happy Morning[.]115
This candid vignette shows intimacy between Durbin and Philis that she relays without
hesitation to his two white sisters. The act of bathing him and listening to his deathbed
declarations may indeed be translated as quotidian duties of a servant, but the close and
private nature of this interaction reveals a mutual inclination toward familiarity and
comfort that goes beyond master and slave. Furthermore, epistolary formalities of that
time may have led her to express disingenuous courtesy in her writing. However, the
remarkable social and racial asymmetry of Phillis and the white sisters gives way to a
confidence in the former black slave’s writing that seems to empower her straightforward
communication. Philis nevertheless remains deferential and observant in her writing by
repeatedly referring to Durbin as “My Dear Master,” but she also conveys her attachment
to him by eventually admitting “you do not know how it destroyed me” and that “I truly
115
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Miss him.”116 At the close of her letter, she pleads for the sisters to return to Charleston
“to relieve [her] Distressing mind” and to “find a Friend.” The exercise of recalling her
beloved’s death renewed the pain she once felt, as she laments, “I would say more but by
heart ache me to think of the past or look at the present.”117
Philis’s closing sentiments portend a conflict of interests that are intensified and
complicated by the aftermath of the Civil War. In thinking about the past, she recalls
Durbin not only as the father of her two children, but also as a protector and provider.
His death tragically marked the end of that security, and also the promised beginning of
her freedom.

At the time of Durbin’s death, President Lincoln had issued the

Emancipation Proclamation, which declared that “all persons held as slaves…shall be
then, thenceforward, and forever free[.]”118 This decree most likely did not change
Philis’s slave status, as South Carolina remained a rebellious state that resisted actual
emancipation until the physical arrival of Union troops.119

The possibility of the

exceptional change in her status would have entangled Durbin’s will in a problematic
archaism—he made provisions for slave succession after emancipation and these
promises found no political or legal grounding. The will also constructed a trust for
Philis and the children, which under the 1841 law, prohibited bequests to slaves.
Possibly freed, but indicated as slaves in the will, Durbin’s legacy to Philis, Charles, and
Cecile, as a post-emancipation testament, made itself vulnerable to attack.
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E. Contesting Durbin’s Will
One may object that Philis’s communication survives as an example of polite
letter writing, but such gentility must not be confused with genuine affection, in light of
the sister’s eventual realization of her relationship with Durbin. Generally, interracial
relationships and the children they produced did not lead slave women to actively seek
the friendship of their master’s sisters. From the sentiments indicated in the
correspondence between Philis and the sisters, no ill will existed that invoked a conflict
over the legitimacy of the interracial liaison. The tone of Philis’s letter indicates warm
familiarity with Elizabeth and Emma, and the white sisters did not resort to legal strategy
to actively deny miscegenation in the interests of excluding Durbin’s black family. Overt
interracial denial did not emerge as a primary objection to the will, although it was
contained in the subtext. In this contest, the sisters objected to the will on three primary
grounds: 1) that testamentary transfers to slaves were invalid; 2) that Durbin appropriated
his father’s estate for his own use and enjoyment; and 3) that the postwar devaluation of
Durbin’s estate deprived them of any interest in his property.
These charges are further complicated by Durbin’s failure to include his sister
Elizabeth in his will. In objection to this exclusion, counsel for the Hubbells contended
that the will intended to spite Elizabeth and her mother by “putting the Negroes over”
their interests.120 Available documents do not record any preliminary disputes between
Durbin and Elizabeth, but it is evident that sometime between her 1861 letter and his
1863 death, something influenced him to exclude her from his will.

Still, he was

“Desirous of seeing his sisters” at the time of his death, as Philis wrote to Elizabeth in her
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letter. She, along with her sister and her mother, comprised the limited circle of his
legitimate next of kin.
Durbin’s will serves as intriguing memoranda of a socially averted yet physically
manifested chapter of slaveholding society. Yet this case turns that silence on its head.
In re Remley does not stand alone by any means—other cases in South Carolina
exemplify the not uncommon practice of miscegenation and concomitant testamentary
expressions of compassion.121 The sheer frequency of inheritance, tax, and criminal
litigation that ensued in southern antebellum courts regarding interracial issues
demonstrates the existence of a “problem” that could not be avoided. Furthermore, these
cases attest to the law’s ability to entertain objections to formal recognitions of mixed
race. In examining these legal documents, a contradictory pattern emerges. Southern
propriety and racial etiquette championed the nonexistence of mixed race, yet particular
laws commemorated the existence and persistence of a supposedly nonexistent
phenomenon. The transfer of property and wealth from white to black memorializes the
testator’s preference to designate these goods in the interests of his mixed race family.
This deliberate act of prioritizing the economic interests of his black family invites a
public postmortem discussion of miscegenation that in his lifetime, remained purely
private. In this act, he calls upon law to investigate, affirm, and sustain the legitimacy of
his subjective articulation of family.
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1. The Slavery Claim
The intention to establish a trust for Philis and the children immediately drew the
attention of the Hubbells, who viewed them not as eligible parties for a testamentary
transfer, but as bonded persons precluded from exercising legal and economic
interests.122

A bill of complaint opposing Philis’s interest described the bequest as

“contrary to Equity and good conscience.”123 This rebuttal draws upon a conception of
the past that eternally equates blackness with slavery.

Even though Durbin wrote his

will after Lincoln’s emancipation of Philis and the children, common sense would dictate
that the Hubbells’ slavery claim found no legitimate ground. Still, Elizabeth and her
husband persisted to contest Durbin’s intent to provide for and support his chosen family;
they saw not a family but a gang of slaves that threatened their free and racialized interest
in his estate.
In their re-creation of the past, the Hubbells necessarily draw upon the twin
factors of distance and time. By establishing a story based on past facts, the final
narrative, augmented by the transformative elements of physical and temporal proximity,
does not necessarily represent the absolute truth. It is important to realize that the parties
had not seen each other since before the Civil War, and they lived in different regions of
the country. For the white Hubbells of Philadelphia to contemplate the black Remleys of
Charleston, they must traverse years of separation, and miles in distance. Being removed
from the South, the Hubbells’ memory of antebellum Charleston perhaps drew from their
own experiences of seeing Philis and her children as slaves and of enslaved blacks in
general. Moreover, the effects of the war could have hardened their previous conceptions
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of their homeland, and the act of revisiting these images exacerbates and intensifies those
previous convictions.
Their focus on the slave status of Philis and her children demonstrates the
Hubbells’ racially motivated objections, and they rely on race privilege as a persuasive
method for denying the validity of the will. They do not deny the existence of the
miscegenous relationship, as their correspondence demonstrates this knowledge.
Because they did not directly attack Philis and her children’s racial status as impediments
to inheritance, the slavery argument displaces this expected rebuttal by fixating on their
former lives as slaves. Presumably, the Hubbells realized the weakness of this objection
to the will, seeing that its postwar execution and contestation dates made the slavery issue
almost moot. Only under Confederate law could this claim have succeeded.
Philis readily responded to this fatuous claim by asserting her rights gained as a
free woman. In her answer to the Hubbells’ complaint, she insisted upon the validity of
the will, emphasizing its creation after her manumission. Arguing for its possible validity
under the regime of slavery, she emphasized that “having been actually emancipated and
made free before the distribution of the estate of Paul D. Remley such bequest should be
held good and valid.”124 On the strength of this claim, she succeeded in establishing her
ability to inherit property.

2. Whether Durbin’s “Appropriation” was Proper
Competing conceptions of the past reemerge in the interpretation of “property” of
the elder Paul Remley’s estate. As stated above, the Hubbells maintained that Philis and
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her children were ineligible to inherit as slaves, but they expanded this argument by also
asserting that the slaves existed as part of the elder Remley’s estate. In this line of
thought, their father’s death entitled them to a share in the slave property, which they
argued that Durbin “appropriated them to his own use and purposes.”125 They expected
Durbin, once appointed as administrator of the estate, to convert the father’s personal
property into money and divide the proceeds equally amongst the heirs. Of this personal
property, which William Hubbell estimated at $36,000, Elizabeth, Emma, and Durbin
would each receive $12,000.126
In the interest of securing a share in Durbin’s estate, the Hubbells appropriated the
meaning of chattel slavery. Here, they did not view Philis as a long-term acquaintance or
fellow heir, but as merchandise which Durbin mishandled in the administration of his
father’s estate. Philis shifts from an article of property to an obstruction of right, one that
displaces their expectation to inheritance. In other words, Durbin’s enumeration of Philis
as a beneficiary rather than a parcel reduces the total value of the money they argued
belonged to them.
He says they are his slaves and then dispenses of their services as his own
property to another person, exclusive of the other heirs—“expressis imicis
alterias exclusis.” If they as he says are taken as his and dispenses of by
him as his then he excludes the other heirs and they can claim for value
received by him.127
Philis, they believed, was not exclusively Durbin’s. Even though he called them “my
negroes Philis and her children,”128 the Hubbells claimed they were theirs as well. This
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way of remembering the past, although legally motivated, aims to diminish the status of
Philis as a rightful beneficiary. Even by invoking her monetary value, they cannot
reasonably relegate her to slave status, but they can insist on recovering this money to
aggrandize a greater share than Durbin had allotted. Thus, in describing Philis as an
object of property rather than its recipient, the white collateral heirs seek financial
security through a shrewd manipulation of the past.

3. The Devaluation of Durbin’s Estate
The value of Durbin’s estate directly relates to the outcome of the Civil War. He
wrote his will after the war began, taking into account the then-current value of his
property. At that time, he considered his estate valuable enough to yield $500 a year for
the comfort and clothing of Philis and her children. Alternatively, he authorized his
trustee James Gray to pay them the amount in full “if in his judgment he shall deem it
judicious and proper.”129 This estimate of his finances and holdings predated the fall of
the Confederacy and the collapse of its economy. Durbin remained aware of the possible
effects of the war, as he directed his executors to invest his money conservatively to
safeguard his postmortem worth throughout the war.

He entrusted them to invest in

“safe Securities, or real estate…until the declaration of peace between these Confederate
States and the United States[.]”130
Durbin’s antebellum legacy to his black family, which would not take effect until
after the war, makes an intriguing study of the influences of history on memory. At once,
the document encompasses three modes of temporality: past, present, and future, each
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intervening to construct, commemorate, and sustain a posterity of interracial wealth
marked by the mercurial economy of the embattled South. When he wrote his will he
remembered his property as he could only imagine—the economic upheaval of the
agrarian based political system which supplied his wealth superseded his testamentary
objectives. As much as he tried to secure his property for Philis, he could not accurately
account for the devaluation of his estate that would swallow his secondary bequests to his
mother Mary and sister Emma. From his standpoint, the subversive act of enriching the
economic lives of his black kin would transcend his death.

In his own act of

remembering and securing the past, he could not contemplate an unforeseen and
unprecedented future.
The Civil War’s effect on property values generated additional testimonies. His
executor, Optimus Hughes, submitted an answer to the Equity Court that described the
conditions of the estate in the aftermath of the Civil War. Returning to Charleston after
serving in the Confederate Army, Hughes found his papers and accounts destroyed. He
recalled the poor economic climate, saying that “everybody was oppressed with anxiety
and great poverty scarcely knowing what to do to obtain food for their families.”131
The disinherited Hubbells argued that the legacy to Philis and her children
deprived them of their fair share in distribution. Objecting to the “fallacy of [Durbin’s]
expectations,” they were not “willing to bear all the losses and give her the full measure
of the legacy.”132 Here lies a problem of ademption as a result of interstate conflict. In
an 1866 memorandum to their attorneys, the Hubbells contended:
But as to Durbin’s will it was made with the view that there would be no loss
in the Estate—but under the Southern Confederacy would be valuable and that
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he could afford to give her $500 a year on 8,000 or so absolutely out of his
share—and have much left.133
Their primary objection to Durbin’s will focuses not only on the devaluation, then, but
also his misappropriation of property to which they felt entitled. While the two sisters
had moved north to Pennsylvania, Durbin remained in South Carolina, inhabiting the
valuable plantation at Remley’s Point and the other properties in Charleston. They
believed that even if Durbin’s will did not make them primary beneficiaries, they
deserved a share in their father’s estate, which they believed Durbin had hoarded for
himself. If his executors sold this property to provide for Philis, she would take “their”
property.

F. Testamentary Freedom and the Interpretation of the Past
The performative aspect of will disputes surfaces in the courts, where competing
conceptions of the past come forth.

Three parties offer different versions of what the

testator intended to bequeath to the heirs: First, the deceased party offers a written
document as evidence of his intentions.

In this testamentary language, he outlines

desired plans for the estate after his death in the presence of witnesses that can attest to its
veracity. Durbin, with three witnesses and an equal number of executors, constructed a
plan to support his companion and their children beyond his death. Second, the named
beneficiary offers a similar conception of the past, and she persists in proving the will as
legal and valid. Philis insisted that Durbin, as the head of her household, earnestly
intended for her entitlement to his estate. As an explicitly listed distributee, she offers the
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will itself as proof of his unquestionable design.134 Lastly, the objectors to the will
submit an alternative version of the true intention of the will, and they envision a
radically different plan of distribution, which they argue as the appropriate version.
According to each of these parties, their version of the past stands as correct.
But in litigation, multiple versions of the same story always exist. Without this
conflict, the issue would become moot; unequal and unpleasant distributions would not
occur, everyone would agree, and all would accede to a singular account of history.
Obviously, that is not the case here, where creative construction works to promote the
subjective interest of any claimant. These multifarious renditions approach Faulknerian
proportions in their radically selective interpretations of what happened. The divisive
and tumultuous factor of race institutes an additional narrative convention in recreating
the past and viewing the family, and interracial conflicts aptly illustrate this interpretive
diversity. As argued by Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, these interpretive conventions
greatly influence the types of actors and events that receive attention, and also the kinds
of evidence accepted as testaments to the past.135 In interracial inheritance disputes,
objectors to miscegenous testamentary bequests appeal to abstract notions of racial
boundaries in order to deny the existence of mixed race. Often times, South Carolina
courts observed the testator’s wishes.136
In the Remley case, the collateral heirs indeed objected to the interracial will, as
they appealed to the Equity Court to “cut the Negroes out entirely.”137 They recognized
that Durbin’s bequest to his black family was “sufficient to take up the whole of his
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interest in his father’s Estate and that there [was] nothing left for any other party.”138 By
excluding his mistress and children, the sisters attempted to erase the recorded legacy that
entitled former slaves, then current kin, to a share in Durbin’s estate. William Hubbell
wrote a letter advising his attorneys to “attack…the validity of the will itself” and to
absorb all of Durbin’s interest to “[leave] nothing for it to take effect upon.”139 Their
objections to the will, in addition to procuring additional wealth for themselves, stem
from their displeasure with Durbin’s tenuous relationship with his white family. They
complained that Durbin “never wrote to them, nor sent anything during the Rebellion”
and that “he never sent them a dollar.”140 Additionally, “he did not even send his Mother
money to pay his Father’s funeral expenses.”141
These letters of objection reveal a desire to reinvent a familial history devoid of
the taint of miscegenation. Hubbell writes that they wish to “undo what has been done,”
explicitly rejecting the past that Durbin had memorialized in his will.142 In denying the
testator’s death wishes, the collateral heirs recreate history in their own image,
championing themselves as the legally and racially eligible distributees. Despite the fact
that Durbin’s wishes were recorded on paper and ratified by witnesses, the white tentative
heirs retell a story of Durbin’s ill health, arguing that his disabled condition from the gun
wound led him to write an invalid will. Only “with a load of shot and wad in his lungs,”
they argue, could they rationalize Durbin’s wishes to spite his family for a gaggle of
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slaves.143

According to this line of thought, respectable white persons would not

reasonably relinquish their property and wealth to bastards and Negroes.
Although the white collateral heirs’ depiction of Durbin’s infirmity and
irresponsibility garnered sympathy from the Equity Court, they did not wholly attempt to
derail Philis from her proper inheritance.

But this nominal inclusion must not be

confused with accepting her as a legitimate distributee. They recognized Philis not as
part of Durbin’s family, but as a servant to their father who deserved compensation “in
consideration of her attention…in his sickness at the Point two or three years before his
death.”144 Seeing themselves as the primary heirs rather than Philis and her children, the
white heirs agreed to allot $2,000 “for her comfort, when she as things proceed proves
worthy of it.”

145

In stark contrast to Durbin’s testamentary intent, Philis received a

pittance while Elizabeth took the majority of his estate. The Equity Court Master
approved this consolation scheme, recommending that “it be accepted as advantageous to
[Philis].”146

Conclusion
The conflict that instigated In re Remley escaped traditional legal methods of
resolution. The complex nature of the case required special attention that the courts of
the common law could not adequately provide. Due to the radical changes in the South’s
political, economic, and legal climate caused by the Civil War, pertinent law that directly
143
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and fairly addressed the postwar administration of an antebellum interracial will did not
exist. Moreover, probate of the will, so soon after the war, yet four years after the
testator’s death, lingered in the postwar instability of South Carolina’s legal system.
Ademption of Durbin’s estate hinged on whether or not Philis and the children could be
considered a loss of “property” and also a misappropriation of the elder Remley’s estate.
Yet, no slave system existed at the time of probate to fund the estate. Thus, South
Carolina’s Equity Court heard the case because it did not fit into existing rules of law,
administering a ruling with a heightened sensitivity to the individual interests of the
parties.147 This courtly invocation of empathy viewed the disinheritance of white heirs
(in favor of black ones) as a viable application for equitable principles.
In re Remley, which spans both antebellum and postwar regimes, forces an
examination of public secrets being legally recognized.

As Austin Sarat argues,

“memory may be attached, or attach itself, to law and be preserved in and through
law.”148 This method of constructing the past in relation to the juridical structures
particular to a place and time works to legitimate and authorize an historical account of
possibilities and improbabilities.

This is a surprising result from a contemporary

viewpoint. To imagine that a former slave’s right to inheritance decreased after the Civil
War confounds a modern understanding of historical memory. It is far easier to imagine
Philis’s chances of inheritance as secure after the war, but it is more difficult to interpret
her diminishing rights after the domestic conflict that presumably attempted to enable
them. Furthermore, to examine her shrinking interest in Durbin’s estate in light of his
147
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testamentary wishes presents a peculiar definition of “equity.” While this translates to an
overt assertion of racial supremacy in objection to clear testamentary intent, it also
demonstrates a shrewd manipulation of legal definitions of family. The Hubbells portray
his effort as a wanton death desire of a country planter “with a load of shot and wad in his
lungs.”149
The claim of incapacity allows the collateral heirs to make legal sense of Durbin’s
unconventional assertion of a multiracial family in the antebellum and postwar South.150
Yet, Durbin did not marry Philis, even though Philis was technically not a slave and state
law permitted interracial marriages at the time of his death. Had he married her, his
siblings would not have had legal grounds to contest the will, and the combination of her
free status and her spousal protection would have enabled her to inherit without
restriction. Yet, South Carolina law enabled the white heirs to succeed in their will
challenge because the legal system upheld the restricted notion of a white, legitimate,
recognized family—which did not include Philis and the children.
State law resisted the probate of Durbin’s will as he intended. His testamentary
objective was clear—he wanted to provide for Philis and the children, and leave his sister
with nothing. The competing conceptions of family—his black one and his white one—
find different treatments in South Carolina courts. Even though he made provisions for
Philis’s “use, clothing and comfort,” his testamentary maneuvering could not overcome
the legal privilege accorded to free whites. His collateral heirs were able to capitalize
149
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upon the law’s favoring of free persons as a way of denying any recognition of Philis as a
family member. Moreover, the massive transformations stemming from the Civil War
changed the composition of Durbin’s estate.

The Civil War, the Emancipation

Proclamation, and the weakening of the southern plantocracy undermined Philis’s claim
to her share of Durbin’s property. He neither lived to see the economic devaluation of his
property nor the legal wranglings that weakened his own family’s testamentary interests.
He did not foresee that law would force his posthumous gifts toward the family that he
wished to ignore. These influences, in addition to the challenges presented by the
Hubbells, precluded Philis, the rightful heir, from obtaining the legacy that Durbin had
established to recognize his mixed-race family.
The story of the Remleys effectively demonstrates the legal parameters of the
Southern white family. First, Mary Shrine could have jeopardized the Remely’s ability to
inherit from their father’s estate if they were found to have African ancestry. Mrs. Shrine
could have limited the definition of legitimate family to those persons who could prove
themselves white. Secondly, Durbin’s collateral heirs relied upon the racial privilege
afford them by law to deny Philis of a monetary legacy that would recognize and perhaps
legitimate her own family. The likelihood of their surprise at the relationship between
Durbin and Philis is low. Yet, the fictional barricade that facilitated white denial in the
face of blatant knowledge acted to deny people of color from taking part in the benefits
accorded to legally recognized family members.151 Not limited to finances alone, law’s
role in maintaining the silence of interracial intimacy creates a social belief of the
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improbability of amalgamated families. Basing the legitimacy of heirship and the absence
of marriage on race rather than blood or testamentary choice underscores the narrative
privilege that white collateral heirs could hold over relatives (white) who wanted to
protect “other” relatives (of color). In this way, the larger legal system supported the
testamentary larceny in blatant contradiction to explicit legal language recognizing,
promoting, and memorializing intimate connections between black and white. In the case
of the Remleys, Durbin’s “family” did not exist as a reality in a legal regime that defined
intimacy in terms of black and white, with nothing in between.
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